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WISCONSIN LEMON LAW HELD
TO REQUIRE REPLACEMENT OF
DEFECTIVE AUTOMOBILE
WITHOUT OFFSET FOR USE
In Chmill v. Friendly Ford-Mercury, 144 Wis.
2d 796, 424 N.W.2d 747 (1988), the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals held that an automobile dealer
and manufacturer are required to replace a consumer's automobile that is substantially impaired
by a "nonconformity" which cannot be repaired
after reasonable attempts. The court also held
that a dealer and manufacturer are not entitled
to a reasonable offset for the consumer's use of
the vehicle if the consumer chooses to have the
vehicle replaced with a comparable new vehicle
rather than a cash refund.
Background
The plaintiffs, Leonard and Ruth Chmill, purchased an automobile manufactured by the
Ford Motor Company ("Ford") and sold by
Friendly Ford-Mercury ("Friendly"). Friendly
gave the Chmills a 12,000 mile new-car warranty.
On the way home from the dealership, Mrs.
Chmill noticed that the car pulled to the left. The
Chmills reported the pulling problem and
brought the automobile to Friendly for repairs
on at least five separate occasions. All five occasions were within five months of the date of
purchase and before the warranty had expired.
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to have
the car repaired, the Chmills brought suit against
Ford and Friendly based on, among other things,
the Wisconsin Lemon Law ("Lemon Law"). Wis.
Stat. § 218.015 (1982 & Supp. 1988). At trial, the
Chmills testified that Friendly's service manager
had advised them that the car should be either
replaced or sold back because the pulling problem could not be repaired. This testimony was
not challenged by the defendants. An experienced car salesman and buyer from another
dealership provided further testimony that the
pulling defect substantially lessened the value of
the car below its original purchased price. The
trial court, in rendering judgment for the
Chmills, ordered the defendants to replace the
automobile. The court held that the pulling
defect substantially impaired the use, value and
safety of the vehicle.
Wisconsin Appellate Court
The appellate court first considered whether
the lower court was correct in finding that the
pulling problem was a nonconformity which did
not satisfy the use, value and safety standards of
the Lemon Law. Section 218.015 allows a consu-

mer to receive either acomparable replacement
or a cash refund for a vehicle which has a nonconformity that cannot be repaired after at least
four reasonable attempts.
The defendants relied on cases decided under
the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."). They
argued that because the Chmills were able to
drive the car 78,000 miles, the car was not substantially impaired. The court disagreed, and distinguished cases decided under the U.C.C. from
those decided under the Lemon Law. Under the
U.C.C., "substantial impairments" are only those
which affect the value of the commercial unit,
whereas under the Lemon Law, "substantial
impairments" are those which affect the use,
safety and value of the unit. The fact that the
vehicle met its primary purpose of transportation was not enough to conclude that it was not
substantially impaired under the Lemon Law.
The court next addressed the issue of whether
the Chmills made reasonable attempts to repair
their car. Section 218.015(2)(b) of the Lemon Law
requires that a consumer establish "after a reasonable attempt to repair the nonconformity
[that the nonconformity] cannot be repaired."
Under the same section, a "reasonable attempt
to repair" means at least four attempts have
been made to repair the same nonconformity
within the period of warranty. The defendants
argued that Friendly had not attempted to repair
the vehicle four times within the warranty period
because it could not verify the pulling defect.
Because the Chmills reported the defect and
presented the car to the defendants for repairs
on at least five different occasions, the court
held that they had sufficiently met the reasonable attempt to repair standard. In so holding, the
court noted that the Lemon Law was a remedial
statute which should be construed "to suppress
the mischief and advance the remedy which the
statute intended to afford." 424 N.W.2d at 751.
Finally, the court considered the defendants'
contention that they were entitled to a reasonable offset for the Chmills' use of the car. Section
218.015(2)(b) gives the consumer the option of
having the defective vehicle replaced with a
comparable new vehicle or receiving a refund
less a "reasonable allowance" for use of the
vehicle. The defendants claimed this language
meant that there isan offset for use whenever a
consumer demands a replacement or a cash
refund. The court rejected this argument, holding that the Lemon Law allows an offset only
when consumers choose the refund option. The
court also rejected the defendants' argument

that if an offset is allowed only when consumers
opt for a refund, then consumers will never
choose the refund option. A consumer might
wish a refund if the defect isimmediately apparent or if the consumer is sufficiently dissatisfied
to want to purchase a different type of vehicle.
Regarding the defendants' argument that the
Chmills would receive a windfall if they were
given a new car without an offset for their use of
the old car, the court held that it was not unreasonable to allow the Chmills to receive a new car
without an offset for use. The Chmills used the
vehicle they purchased from Friendly because

Friendly had been unable to repair the defect.
Moreover, the Chmills had been required to
litigate their claim for over ayear and had necessarily used the car during this period.
Finally, the court noted that the Lemon Law
provides that the court may award costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorneys' fees, including attorneys' fees for essential appellate
work. The court concluded that on remand the
trial court should determine reasonable attorneys' fees to award to the Chmills for their appeal. Such an award was necessary to fully enforce the Chmills' rights under the Lemon Law.
Elbert D. Reniva

ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
HOLDS THAT A MARKETING
PLAN NEED NOT MEET FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION CRITERIA
TO QUALIFY AS A PYRAMID
SALES SCHEME

the number of "down-line" subscribers, ranging from 1%, or $1.08/month, for the first downline level (three subscribers), to 6% plus a 5%
bonus, or $77,944.68/month, for the ninth level
(19,683 subscribers).
Subscribers could become marketers merely
by signing the marketer's agreement, but individuals who wished to become marketers without being subscribers were required to pay a
"set-up" charge of $52. Although not required
to do so, all 10,874 subscribers had signed marketers' agreements. Approximately 1000 of these
signatories were active marketers.
Procedural History
The State of Illinois ("State") brought suit
against Unimax and its president, Tim Dern,
under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, ("the Act"). Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 261-272 (1987). The State
alleged that Unimax's marketing plan was a
"pyramid sales scheme" and a "chain referral
sales technique" in violation of the Act. The
State sought appointment of a receiver and
asked the court to enjoin the defendants from
selling memberships. Further, the State asked
that Unimax provide an accounting, that it be
forced to disgorge all profits, and that it be
assessed $50,000.
Unimax argued that its operations were
neither a pyramid sales scheme nor a chain referral sales technique as prohibited by the Act.
Section 1(g) of the Act defines a "pyramid sales
scheme" as one in which aperson pays rmoney in
exchange for the opportunity to receive a benefit primarily "based upon the inducement of
additional persons" to participate in the same
plan or operation. Unimax claimed that the tra-

In People ex rel. Hartigan v. Unimax Inc., 168
Ill. App. 3d 718,523 N.E.2d 26 (1st Dist. 1988), the
Illinois Appellate Court for the First District concluded that headhunting fees, inventory loading, and endless chains are not required to
prove the existence of an illegal pyramid sales
scheme.
Background
Unimax, Inc. ("Unimax"), an Illinois corporation, engaged in two separate activities: Unimax
Buyers' Service and Unimax Matrix. Unimax
Buyers' Service members, or "subscribers," completed an application and paid initial, monthly,
and annual fees for the opportunity to purchase
products and services at a discount. Subscribers
were not obligated to make any purchases and
could withdraw from the service at any time and
obtain a refund of their unused fees.
Members of Unimax Matrix, or "marketers,"
signed an "Independent Marketer's Agreement" and were given training in selling memberships in the Unimax Buyers' Service. Unimax
required marketers to recruit at least three new
subscribers, and to keep themselves and their
subscribers up to date on fee payments. Marketers earned monthly commissions on the fees
paid by the subscribers they sponsored. They
also received commissions on subscription fees
from subscribers in their "down-line" organization. Commission rates increased according to
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